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and Eiji OKAMOTOy, Fellow
SUMMARY Cryptographic protocols enable participating parties to
compute any function of their inputs without leaking any information be-
yond the output. A card-based protocol is a cryptographic protocol imple-
mented by physical cards. In this paper, for constructing protocols with
small numbers of shues, we introduce a new type of cards, regular poly-
gon cards, and a new protocol, oblivious conversion. Using our cards, we
construct an addition protocol on non-binary inputs with only one shue
and two cards. Furthermore, using our oblivious conversion protocol, we
construct the first protocol for general functions in which the number of
shues is linear in the number of inputs.
key words: card-based protocol, regular polygon cards
1. Introduction
1.1 Background
In 1989, den Boer [2] proposed a protocol called the Five-
Card Trick, which can securely compute the AND function,
using five cards that have two types of front sides ( | , ~ )
and identical back sides ( ? ). The feasibility of basing
cryptographic protocols on this, i.e., what functions can be
securely computed by these cards, was solved by the sub-
sequent works [1], [9]. On the other hand, the eciency,
i.e., how many cards and shues are sucient to compute a
function, is still an important question.
In terms of the number of cards, Nishida et al. [11]
showed that for any Boolean function f : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1g,
it is possible to construct a (2n + 6)-card protocol, using
the elementary protocols proposed by Mizuki and Sone [9].
Since n-bit input uses 2n cards, their result showed that only
six additional cards are sucient to compute any function.
However, it has remained an open problem to provide upper
bounds on the number of shues required to compute any
function.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose new techniques for constructing a
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Table 1 Comparison between our protocols and previous protocols.
Card # of shues # of cards
 Addition and Subtraction over Z=mZ
[4], [9] based standard O(logm) O(logm)
Ours m-sided 1 2
 Multiplication by c 2 Z=mZ
[4], [9] based standard O(log c  logm) O(log c  logm)
Ours m-sided dlog2 ce + 1 dlog2 ce + 2
 Protocol for an arbitrary f : (Z=mZ)n ! Z=mZ
[11] based standard O(mn  logm) 2((n + 1)dlog2 me + 2)
Ours m-sided n m + n + mn
 Protocol for an arbitrary f : (Z=2Z)n ! Z=2Z
[11] standard O(2n) 2(n + 3)
Ours standard n 2(n + 2n)
card-based protocol with small number of shues. The first
technique is to introduce a new type of cards, a regular poly-
gon card. In contrast to all the previous works, our card can
deal with multiple values naturally. This leads to a new type
of protocols using only a small number of shues, which
cannot be achieved using the previous cards. The second
technique is an oblivious conversion, which is a new proto-
col. It is used to construct a protocol for general functions
using only a small number of shues. The details of our
contribution are follows.
The regularm-sided polygon cards have (360=m) rota-
tional symmetry. Using the cards introduced by den Boer [2]
(hereafter the standard cards), the previous addition proto-
cols over Z=mZ require that the numbers of shues and
cards are proportional to logm. On the other hand, using
the regular m-sided polygon cards, we construct an addition
protocol over Z=mZ that requires one shue and two cards
(Table 1). We also construct a multiplication protocol with
dlog2 ce + 1 shues, where c is the multiplication factor,
while the previous binary protocol requires O(log c  logm)
shues (Table 1).
Our oblivious conversion is a protocol that takes an
encoding of a 2 Z=mZ and a function f as inputs, and out-
puts an encoding of f (a). Using it iteratively, we construct
a protocol for any function f (x1;    ; xn) with only 2n shuf-
fles while it requires O(2n) number of cards (Table 1). We
note that such a protocol can be implemented by both our
polygon cards and the standard cards. This result is com-
plementary to that of Nishida et al. [11]: they constructed
a protocol for any function with only 2n + 6 standard cards
Oblivious conversion is named after the oblivious transfer.
Copyright c 2017 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
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Table 2 Comparison of voting protocols for n voters.
[4] (standard) Ours (polygon)
# of candidates 2 `
# of shues O(n log n) n + 1
# of cards 2dlog2 ne + 6 (n + 2)`
and O(2n) number of shues.
By designing a specific protocol in a careful way, we
can achieve a protocol with both a small number of shues
and cards. As an example, we construct a voting protocol.
For n voters and ` candidates, our protocol uses n+1 shues
and (n + 2)` cards (Table 2).
1.3 Related Works
In 1993, Cre´peau and Kilian [1] achieved protocols imple-
menting any function by constructing composable elemen-
tary protocols (COPY/XOR/AND). In 2009, Mizuki and
Sone [9] constructed composable elementary protocols us-
ing fewer cards, by applying a new shue called a random
bisection cut. Using these protocols, the number of shuf-
fles needed to evaluate a function f is exactly the number of
gates of f . Our construction (Sect. 4) improves the number
of shues by the number of inputs, which is strictly smaller
than the number of gates.
We note that almost all previous works [1]–[13], [17],
[18] only consider binary inputs. Our polygon cards enable
us to construct the first non-binary protocols.
2. Basic Notation
In this section, we introduce a regular polygon card and ba-
sic notations for describing card-based protocols.
2.1 Regular Polygon Cards
Let m  3 be an integer. A regular m-sided polygon card
is a card having a back side with (360=m) rotational sym-
metry and a front side with no rotational symmetry. For the
sake of easy description, hereafter we use a concrete regular
polygon card, a regular four-sided polygon card: its front
side is " and its back side is  . The elements of Z=4Z
(hereafter Z4) naturally correspond to rotations of a card as
shown below.
" = 0; " = 1; " = 2; " = 3:
For x 2 Z4, we use [[x]] to denote the back side of a card
that corresponds to x. We also use x to denote not only
an element in Z4 but also the front side card, as long as it
is clear from the context. The important property is that
[[0]]; [[1]]; [[2]] and [[3]] have the identical face  .
Although a “two-sided polygon” makes little geomet-
ric sense, the card whose back side has a 180 rotationally
symmetric pattern [8] can be regarded as a regular two-
sided polygon card. Its front side is " and its back side is
. (Note that its shape is a rectangle instead of a square.)
Clearly, the back side has 180 rotational symmetry.
We note that all of our protocols can be applied to m-
sided polygon cards for any m  2 while our descriptions
use four-sided polygon cards.
2.2 Basic Definitions
We define basic definitions: stack, sequence, top function,
rotation function, and flip function.
(1) Stack and Sequence
We first define a stack and a stacking operation “”, recur-
sively as follows.
 A card c is a stack.
 If d1 and d2 are stacks, then d1  d2 is a stack.
For example, for k cards c1; c2;    ; ck, d = c1  c2      ck is
a stack of k cards.
We next define a sequence, which is a line of stacks,
recursively as follows.
 If d is a stack, (d) is a sequence.
 If s = (d1;    ; dk) is a sequence and d is a stack, then
(d1;    ; dk; d) is a sequence.
(2) Top Function
Following the formalization [7], we define a top function
top, which returns the visible face of a card, as follows.
For a card with upward facing front side x 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g,
top(x) = x whereas top([[x]]) = ? (here, ? is a symbol
meaning “back side”). For a stack d = c1    ck, top(d) =
(top(c1))k, where superscript denotes the number of cards
rather than exponentiation. This means that the visible face
of the stack is the same as the visible face of the top card ex-
cept the number of cards. For a sequence s = (d1;    ; dk),
top(s) = (top(d1);    ; top(dk)).
Example 1: The following stacks s1 and s2 satisfy
top(s1) = ?2 and top(s2) = ?3. The following sequence
S 3 satisfies top(S 3) = (?; 2;?2).
s1 = [[0]]  [[1]] = |{z}
[[0]][[1]]
: s2 = [[0]]  1  [[2]] = |{z}
[[0]]1[[2]]
:
S 3 = ([[0]]; 2; [[2]]  3) =

|{z}
[[0]]
; " ; |{z}
[[2]]3

:
(3) Rotation Function
We define a rotation function rot, which returns a card ro-
tated by a clockwise 90 rotation, as follows. For a card with
upward facing front side x 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g, rot(x) = x+1 mod 4
whereas rot([[x]]) = [[x 1 mod 4]]. For a stack d = c1    ck,
rot(d) = rot(c1)    rot(ck). For a sequence s = (d1;    ; dk),
rot(s) = (rot(d1);    ; rot(dk)).
Example 2:
rot(0) = rot
 "  = " = 1:
1902
IEICE TRANS. FUNDAMENTALS, VOL.E100–A, NO.9 SEPTEMBER 2017
rot([[0]]) = rot

|{z}
[[0]]

= |{z}
[[3]]
= [[3]]:
rot([[0]]  0) = rot

|{z}
[[0]]0

= |{z}
[[3]]1
= [[3]]  1:
(4) Flip Function
We define a flip function flip, which returns the flipped
cards, as follows. For a card with upward facing front
side x 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g, flip(x) = [[x]] whereas flip([[x]]) = x.
For a stack d = c1  c2    ck 1  ck, flip(d) = flip(ck) 
flip(ck 1)    flip(c2)flip(c1). For a sequence s = (d1;    ; dk),
flip(s) = (flip(d1);    ; flip(dk)).
Example 3:
flip(0) = flip
 "  = |{z}
[[0]]
= [[0]]:
flip([[0]]  [[1]]) = flip

|{z}
[[0]][[1]]

=
"|{z}
10
= 1  0:
2.3 Operations
(1) Basic Operations on a Sequence
Let s = (d1;    ; dk) be a sequence. We define the following
operations for s.
Transposition: For any 1  i < j  k, a transposition
operation (i; j) for s returns the following sequence
(d1;    ; di 1; d j; di+1;    ; d j 1; di; d j+1;    ; dk):
Since every permutation can be represented by trans-
positions, we can rearrange a sequence arbitrarily.
Rotation: For any 1  i  k, a rotation operation of the
i-th stack for s returns the following sequence
(d1;    ; di 1; rot(di); di+1;    ; dk):
Flip: For any 1  i  k, a flip operation of the i-th stack for
s returns the following sequence
(d1;    ; di 1; flip(d); di+1;    ; dk):
We call a flip operation open when the stack is a stack-
ing of face-down cards.
Composition/Decomposition: For any 1  i < j  k,
a composition operation of the i-th stack and the j-th
stack for s returns the following sequence
(d1;    ; di 1; di  d j; di+1;    ; d j 1; d j+1;    ; dk):
If the i-th stack is di = d  c, where d is a stack and c is
a card, a decomposition operation of the i-th stack for
s returns the following sequence
(d1;    ; di 1; d; c; di+1;    ; dk):
Composition/Decomposition with Flip: For any 1  i <
j  k, a composition operation with flip of the i-th stack
and the j-th stack for s returns the following sequence
(d1;    ; di 1; di flip(d j); di+1;    ; d j 1; d j+1;    ; dk):
We note that this operation can be done without reveal-
ing face(flip(d j)) by utilizing a non-transparent cover to
mask face(flip(d j)). If the i-th stack is di = c  d, where
c is a card and d is a stack, a decomposition operation
with flip of the i-th stack for s returns the following se-
quence
(d1;    ; di 1; c; flip(d); di+1;    ; dk):
Similarly, this can be done without revealing face(d).
Insert/Delete An insert operation for s returns the follow-
ing sequence
(d1;    ; dk 1; dk; 0):
A delete operation for s returns the following sequence
(d1;    ; dk 1):
(2) Cyclic Shue
A cyclic shue (which is denoted by hi)D
   
E1 2 3 4
results in one of the the following sequences
   
1 2 3 4
;    
2 3 4 1
;    
3 4 1 2
;    
4 1 2 3
each occurring with probability 1=4. In general, a cyclic
shue takes a sequence (s1; s2;    ; sk) such that top(si) =
?`i for some integer `i, and outputs one of the following
sequences8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(s1; s2; s3;    ; sk 1; sk)
(s2; s3; s4;    ; ; sk; s1)
:::
(sk; s1; s2;    ; sk 2; sk 1)
each occurring with probability 1=k.
We say that a cyclic shue is an equal shue if
top(s1) = top(s2) =    = top(sk). In this paper, we use
only equal shues and rotation shues defined later. Re-
cently, Nishimura et al. [13] showed that an unequal shue,
which is not an equal shue, can be securely implemented
by using a special type of boxes.
(3) Rotation Shue
For a stack d, a rotation shue (which is denoted by ())
|{z}
d

results in one of the four stacks
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|{z}
rot0(d)
|{z}
rot1(d)
|{z}
rot2(d)
|{z}
rot3(d)
each occurring with probability 1=4. For example, for d =
[[a]]  [[b]], a rotation shue results in one of the followings.8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
[[a]]  [[b]]
[[a   1]]  [[b   1]]
[[a   2]]  [[b   2]]
[[a   3]]  [[b   3]]
On the other hand, for d = [[a]]  b, a rotation shue results
in one of the followings.8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
[[a]]  b
[[a   1]]  (b + 1)
[[a   2]]  (b + 2)
[[a   3]]  (b + 3)
It plays an important role in designing our addition protocol
(Sect. 3.1).
2.4 Security
Let  be a protocol. Let ( 0; 1;    ; t) be a history of
sequences in a protocol run, i.e.,  0 is an initial sequence
determined by inputs,  i+1 arises from  i by a physical op-
eration (e.g. shue, rearrangement, openy), and  t is a fi-
nal sequence. Now we define a visible sequence trace by
(top( 0); top( 1);    ; top( t)). We say that  is secure if a
random variable of the visible sequence trace and a random
variable of inputs are independent.
Definition 1 (Security): Let  be a protocol. Let V be a
random variable of the visible sequence of  and let U be
the set of inputs of. We say that is secure if for any input
distribution X on U, X and V are independet.
Example 4: See the following (meaningless) protocol ex.
1. Place the two cards according to a; b 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g:
|{z}
[[a]]
|{z}
[[b]]
:
2. Apply a cyclic shue:D
|{z}
[[a]]
|{z}
[[b]]
E
!   :
3. Open the left-side card:
|{z}

 :
4. Output the right-side card.
yWe call by open an operation which turns over a back side
card.
The history of sequences in a protocol run, when the cyclic
shue exchanges the two cards, is the following.
( 0; 1; 2; 3) = (([[a]]; [[b]]); ([[b]]; [[a]]); (b; [[a]]); [[a]]):
The random variable of the visible sequence of ex is
V = ((?;?); (?;?); (;?);?):
where  is a random variable on fa; bg. The set of inputs U
of the above protocol is as below.
U =

(a; b) j 0  a; b  3	:
ex is not secure since  depends on the inputs (a; b).
3. Addition Protocol
In this section, we construct an addition, a subtraction and a
copy protocols, which use only a rotation shue. We also
construct a c-multiplication protocol for any c 2 Zm, which
takes [[a]] and outputs [[ca]]. It uses (dlog2 ce + 1) shues
and (dlog2 ce + 2) cards.
3.1 Addition Protocol
Our addition protocol takes [[a]] and [[b]] as inputs, and
outputs [[a + b mod 4]]. One can see the demonstration
movie [15].
Protocol 1 (Addition Protocol):
 Input: ([[a]]; [[b]]).
 Output: [[a + b mod 4]].
1. Apply a composition with flip:
|{z}
[[a]]
|{z}
[[b]]
! |{z}
[[a]]b
:
2. Apply a rotation shue:
|{z}
[[a]]b

! |{z}
[[a r]](b+r)
;
where r is a random integer with 0  r  3.
3. Apply a decomposition with flip to the stack:
|{z}
[[a r]](b+r)
! |{z}
[[a r]]
|{z}
[[b+r]]
:
4. Open the left-side card [[a   r]]:
|{z}
a r
|{z}
[[b+r]]
:
5. Rotate the second card  (a   r) times and output it:
rot (a r)

|{z}
[[b+r]]

= |{z}
[[a+b]]
:
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Theorem 1: The above protocol is secure. It uses one shuf-
fle and two cards.
Proof. We prove the security of the above protocol, which
uses one shue and two cards. Let A (or B) be a random
variable of the first input (second input, respectively). Let
X = (A; B) be a random variable of the inputs. Let R be
a random variable of the randomness used in the rotation
shue. The random variable of the visible sequence V is
V = ((?;?); (?2); (?2); (?;?); (E;?); (?))
where E = A   R mod 4. E and A are independent since
Pr[E =  j A = a] = 1=4 and Pr[E = ] = 1=4 for any
a;  2 f0; 1; 2; 3g. Therefore, V and X are independent since
E and X are also independent and V is just derived from E.
Thus, the above protocol is secure. 
Corollary 1: There is a secure protocol that takes as inputs
[[a]] and ([[b1]];    ; [[bk]]), and outputs ([[a + b1]];    ; [[a +
bk]]) with one shue and k + 1 cards. Especially, there is
a secure protocol that takes as inputs [[a]], and outputs k
copies of [[a]] with one shue and k+ 1 cards for any k 2 N.
Proof. By replacing the stack [[a]] bwith a stack [[a]] b1 b2 
    bk, we have a multiple addition protocol. This protocol
uses one shue and k + 1 cards, and its security is proven
in the same way as above. Applying the multiple addition
protocol to the inputs b1 = b2 =    = bk = 0, we have a
copy protocol that outputs k copies of [[a]]. 
Subtraction is also possible using the same idea of the
addition protocol. The dierences are: use a stack [[a]]  [[b]]
instead of [[a]]  b and rotate with inverse direction in the last
step. We omit the security proof since it is almost identical
to the proof for the addition protocol.
Corollary 2: There is a secure protocol that takes as inputs
[[a]] and [[b]], and outputs [[b   a]] with one shue and two
cards.
3.2 Multiplication Protocol
In this section, we construct a c-multiplication protocol for
any public value c 2 Zm, that takes [[a]] and outputs [[ca]].
Trivially, such a computation can be done by using our ad-
dition protocol c times. On the other hand, it is well known
that the number of additions can be reduced to O(log2 c) (bi-
nary method). In this section, we design a multiplication
protocol in a careful way and show that (dlog2 ce + 1) shuf-
fles are sucient to compute the multiplication [[ca]] from
[[a]].
Protocol 2 (c-Multiplication Protocol):
 Input: [[a]].
 Output: [[ca]].
Let ` = dlog2 ce and c   1 =
P` 1
j=0 2
j  b j where b j 2 f0; 1g.
1. Invoke our (` + 1)-copy protocol to [[a]]:
|{z}
[[a]]
!
`+1z                     }|                     {
|{z}
[[a]]
|{z}
[[a]]
   |{z}
[[a]]
:
2. LetW  ([[a]];    ; [[a]]|          {z          }
`+1
). For i = 0; 1;    ; ` 1, repeat
the following.
a. Let W = (
` iz           }|           {
[[w]];    ; [[w]]; [[z]]). (Note that w = 2ia
and z = (
Pi 1
j=0 2
jb j + 1)a.)
b. If bi = 0, apply a multiple addition protocol to W
except for [[z]]:
` iz                     }|                     {
|{z}
[[w]]
|{z}
[[w]]
   |{z}
[[w]]
|{z}
[[z]]
!
` i 1z            }|            {
|{z}
[[2w]]
   |{z}
[[2w]]
|{z}
[[z]]
c. If bi = 1, apply a multiple addition protocol toW:
` iz                     }|                     {
|{z}
[[w]]
|{z}
[[w]]
   |{z}
[[w]]
|{z}
[[z]]
!
` i 1z            }|            {
|{z}
[[2w]]
   |{z}
[[2w]]
|{z}
[[z+w]]
d. Update W to the current sequence. Note that the
length of W has now decreased by one.
3. W is now just the rightmost card [[z]], where z =
(
P` 1
j=0 2
jb j + 1)a = ca. Output the card [[z]].
Theorem 2: The above protocol is secure. It uses dlog2 ce+
1 shues and dlog2 ce + 2 cards.
Proof. Let ` = dlog2 ce. Let A be a random variable of
the input, and let V be a random variable of the visible se-
quence. Let E be a random variable of the opened value in
copy protocol invoked in Step 1, and let Ei (i 2 f1;    ; `g)
be a random variable of the opened value in addition proto-
col invoked in the (i 1)-th iteration of Step 2. As mentioned
in the proof of Theorem 1, A and Ei are independent. More-
over, A and (E0; E1;    ; E`) are also independent since each
Ei is derived from each shue. Thus, A and V are indepen-
dent since V essentially consists of E0; E1;    ; E`. There-
fore, it is secure. 
Example 5: Let c = 6. Here, ` = dlog2 ce = 3 and 5 =P2
i=0 2
ibi = 20  1 + 21  0 + 22  1. The execution process of
c-multiplication protocol is as follows.
1. [[a]]
Copy 4    ! ([[a]]; [[a]]; [[a]]; [[a]]).
2. ([[a]]; [[a]]; [[a]]; [[a]])
Add  ! ([[2a]]; [[2a]]; [[2a]]).
3. ([[2a]]; [[2a]]; [[2a]])
Add  ! ([[4a]]; [[2a]]).
4. ([[4a]]; [[2a]])
Add  ! [[6a]].
4. Oblivious Conversion
In this section, we introduce a new protocol, oblivious con-
version, that enables secure computation for general func-
tions with a small number of shues.
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4.1 Oblivious Conversion
The oblivious conversion protocol takes as input a value
[[a]], a 2 Zm, and an encoding of a function f using a se-
quence of stacks ( f1;    ; fm 1) where top( fi) = ?k for some
integer k. Each stack fi is regarded as an encoding of f (i).
The output of the protocol will be fa, which corresponds to
an encoding of f (a). For simplicity, we will set m = 4 in
the following description. One can see the demonstration
movie [14].
Protocol 3 (Oblivious Conversion):
 Input: [[a]] and ( f0; f1; f2; f3).
 Output: fa.
1. Using a copy protocol and rotation operations, generate
A = ([[a]]; [[a   1]]; [[a   2]]; [[a   3]]) from [[a]]. Let W
be the following sequence:
W = |{z}
[[a]] f0
|{z}
[[a 1]] f1
|{z}
[[a 2]] f2
|{z}
[[a 3]] f3
:
2. Apply a cyclic shue to W and obtain the following
sequence:
|{z}
[[a r]] fr
|{z}
[[a (r+1)]] fr+1
|{z}
[[a (r+2)]] fr+2
|{z}
[[a (r+3)]] fr+3
where r is the randomness used in the shue.
3. Decompose the stack as shown below:
[[a r]]z}|{

[[a (r+1)]]z}|{

[[a (r+2)]]z}|{

[[a (r+3)]]z}|{

|{z}
fr
|{z}
fr+1
|{z}
fr+2
|{z}
fr+3
4. Open the cards in the top line:
a rz}|{ a (r+1)z}|{ a (r+2)z}|{ a (r+3)z}|{
|{z}
fr
|{z}
fr+1
|{z}
fr+2
|{z}
fr+3
5. Output the stack under the card 0.
Theorem 3: The above oblivious conversion protocol us-
ing m-sided polygon cards is secure. (It takes as inputs [[a]]
and f0; f1;    ; fm 1, and outputs fa.) It uses two shues and
m(k+1)+1 cards, where k is the number of cards contained
in the stack fi.
Proof. Let A be a random variable of the input, and let V
be a random variable of the visible sequence. Let E be a
random variable of the opened value in the copy protocol
of Step 1. Let R be a random variable of the randomness
used in the cyclic shue used in Step 2. Let E0 = A  
R mod 4. As mentioned in the proof of Theorem 1, A and E
are independent. Similarly, A and E0 are independent. (The
only dierence is that the latter uses a cyclic shue but it
does not aect this claim.) Moreover, A and (E; E0) are also
independent since E and E0 are derived from independent
and dierent shues. Thus, A and V are independent since
V essentially consists of E; E0. Therefore, it is secure. 
4.2 General Protocol
Using our oblivious conversion, Alice and Bob can securely
compute an arbitrary function f (x1; x2) whose input-domain
and output-range are Zm.
Protocol 4 (Two-Party Protocol):
 Input: Alice has a 2 Z4 and Bob has b 2 Z4.
 Output: [[ f (a; b)]].
1. Alice and Bob generate [[a]] and [[b]], respectively.
2. Alice and Bob place the following sequences
F0; F1; F2; F3:
F0 = |{z}
[[ f (0;0)]]
|{z}
[[ f (0;1)]]
|{z}
[[ f (0;2)]]
|{z}
[[ f (0;3)]]
F1 = |{z}
[[ f (1;0)]]
|{z}
[[ f (1;1)]]
|{z}
[[ f (1;2)]]
|{z}
[[ f (1;3)]]
F2 = |{z}
[[ f (2;0)]]
|{z}
[[ f (2;1)]]
|{z}
[[ f (2;2)]]
|{z}
[[ f (2;3)]]
F3 = |{z}
[[ f (3;0)]]
|{z}
[[ f (3;1)]]
|{z}
[[ f (3;2)]]
|{z}
[[ f (3;3)]]
.
3. Let F0i be a stack that is stacking of Fi. Using an obliv-
ious conversion with inputs [[a]] and (F00; F
0
1; F
0
2; F
0
3),
they compute F0a.
4. Let Fa be a sequence that is decomposing of F0a. Using
an oblivious conversion with inputs [[b]] and Fa, they
compute [[ f (a; b)]]. This is the output of this protocol.
Theorem 4: Let f : (Zm)n ! Zm be an arbitrary n-ary
function. There is a secure protocol that takes as inputs
([[a1]];    ; [[an]]) and [[ f (x1;    ; xn)]] for all x1;    ; xn 2
Zm, and outputs [[ f (a1;    ; an)]]. It uses 2n shues and
m + n + mn cards.
Proof. Extending the above protocol in a canonical way, it
is possible to construct an n-party protocol. We first show
that the protocol uses m + n + mn cards. The number of
input cards is n + mn. To copy [[a1]], we needs m addi-
tional cards. On the other hand, we does not need additional
cards to copy [[a2]];    ; [[an]] since the opened cards can be
reused. Thus, the number of cards is m + n + mn. Next
we show the security of the protocol. Let A be a random
variable of the input, and let V be a random variable of the
visible sequence. For the i-th (i = 1; 2;    ; n) oblivious con-
version, let E2i 1 be a random variable of the opened value
in the copy protocol, and let E2i be a random variable of the
opened value in the last step. As mentioned in the proof of
Theorem 3, A and (E2i 1; E2i) are independent. Since each
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random variable is independently derived from each shue,
A and (E1; E2;    ; E2n) are also independent. Thus, A and
V are independent. Therefore, it is secure. 
4.3 Oblivious Conversion Using the Standard Cards
The oblivious conversion can also be applied to the standard
cards ( | , ~ ). We use the following standard encoding
| ~ = 0 and ~ | = 1, and denote the face down en-
coding of a by Com(a). We also use a random bisection cut
(which is denoted by [jj]) as below:h
? ?
 ? ? i1 2 3 4 ! ? ? ? ?1 2 3 4 or ? ? ? ?3 4 1 2 :
We note that it is derived from the cyclic shue by making
stacks 1  2 and 3  4.
Protocol 5 (Oblivious Conversion Using Standard Cards):
 Input: Com(a) and two cards (or stacks) f (0) and f (1).
 Output: The card (or stack) f (a).
1. Place the cards as below.
? ?|  {z  }
Com(a)
?|{z}
f (0)
?|{z}
f (1)
2. Rearrange the cards as below.
? ? ? ?
@@R  	
? ? ? ? :
3. Apply a random bisection cut.h
? ?
 ? ? i ! ? ? ? ?
4. Rearrange the cards as below.
? ? ? ?
@@R  	
? ? ? ? :
5. Open the first and second cards, then the output card
f (a) is obtained as follows.
| ~ ?|{z}
f (a)
? or ~ | ? ?|{z}
f (a)
Theorem 5: The above oblivious conversion is secure. It
uses one shue and 2k + 2 cards, where k is the number of
cards contained in f (0).
Proof. The opened value is independent of the inputs since
the randomness used in the shue is chosen uniformly at
random and independent of the inputs. Thus, it is secure. 
5. Voting Protocol for Multiple Candidates
In this section, we construct a voting protocol. Assume that
there are n voters A1;    ; An and ` candidates C1;    ;C`.
Each voter Ai has an input ai 2 f1;    ; `g. They wish to
securely compute ci =
Pn
j=1 i(a j), where i(x) = 1 if x = i,
otherwise i(x) = 0.
We will explicitly describe a voting protocol with two
voters A; B and three candidates. The protocol takes as in-
puts A’s input a 2 f1; 2; 3g and B’s input b 2 f1; 2; 3g, and
outputs ([[1(a) + 1(b)]]; [[2(a) + 2(b)]]; [[3(a) + 3(b)]]).
In the following, we will consider a simplified voting
protocol which illustrates the idea behind and the correct-
ness of the full protocol (Protocol 6). However, the sim-
plified protocol does not hide which candidate each of the
voters A and B vote for, and is hence not secure.
1. Place the cards as below:
|{z}
[[1(a)]]
|{z}
[[2(a)]]
|{z}
[[3(a)]]
|{z}
[[1(b)]]
|{z}
[[2(b)]]
|{z}
[[3(b)]]
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[0]]
2. Open the first row. Then, add one to the bottom-most
card whose top card was [[1]]. For example, if the open-
ing of the top row is as shown, then add one to the
bottom-most card of the leftmost column:
" " "
  
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[0]]
!
" " "
  
|{z}
[[1]]
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[0]]
3. Open the second row. Then, add one to the bottom-
most card whose top card was [[1]]. For example, if the
opening of the top row is as shown, then add one to the
bottom-most card of the center column:
" " "
" " "
|{z}
[[1]]
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[0]]
!
" " "
" " "
|{z}
[[1]]
|{z}
[[1]]
|{z}
[[0]]
4. Output the bottom row.
From the above description, it should be clear the sim-
plified protocol correctly computes the voting result. How-
ever, as highlighted above, the protocol reveal which candi-
date each voter voted for.
In order to obtain the security, we use a cyclic shue.
More concretely, we apply a cyclic shue to the sequence
(d1; d2; d3), where di is a stacking of the i-th column, and
open the top row. Now the input is completely hidden due
to the randomness of the cyclic shue. To keep track of the
order of candidates when applying the cyclic shues, we
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append a sequence ([[1]]; [[0]]; [[0]]) which will be opened at
the end of the protocol. The protocol proceeds as follows.
Protocol 6 (Voting Protocol):
 Input: a; b 2 f1; 2; 3g.
 Output: ([[y1]]; [[y2]]; [[y3]]) where yi = i(a) + i(b).
1. Place the cards as below:
|{z}
[[1(a)]]
|{z}
[[2(a)]]
|{z}
[[3(a)]]
|{z}
[[1(b)]]
|{z}
[[2(b)]]
|{z}
[[3(b)]]
|{z}
[[1]]
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[0]]
We use terms a column and a row in the usual sense. In
this case, we have three columns and four rows.
2. Make three stacks c1 = [[1(a)]]  [[1(b)]]  [[1]]  [[0]],
c2 = [[2(a)]]  [[2(b)]]  [[0]]  [[0]] and c3 = [[3(a)]] 
[[3(b)]]  [[0]]  [[0]]. Apply a cyclic shue:D
|{z}
c1
|{z}
c2
|{z}
c3
E
!    :
3. Open the top row and remove the top row. Then, add
one to the bottom-most card whose top card was [[1]].
For example, if the opening of the top row is as shown,
then add one to the bottom-most card of the rightmost
column:
" " "
  
  
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[0]]
!
  
  
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[0]]
|{z}
[[1]]
4. Let c01; c
0
2 and c
0
3 be the current columns. Apply a cyclic
shue to (c01; c
0
2; c
0
3):D
|{z}
c01
|{z}
c02
|{z}
c03
E
!    :
5. Open the top row and remove the top row. Then, add
one to the bottom-most card whose top card was [[1]].
For example, if the opening of the top row is as shown,
then add one to the bottom-most card of the center col-
umn:
" " "
  
|{z}
[[x]]
|{z}
[[x0]]
|{z}
[[x00]]
!   
|{z}
[[x+1]]
|{z}
[[x0]]
|{z}
[[x00]]
6. Let c001 ; c
00
2 and c
00
3 be the current columns. Apply a
cyclic shue to (c001 ; c
00
2 ; c
00
3 ):D
|{z}
c001
|{z}
c002
|{z}
c003
E
!    :
7. Open the top row. Rearrange the current sequence
cyclically such that the column which has one in the
top is the leftmost column. For example, if the opening
of the top row is as shown, then rearrange as below:
" " "
|{z}
[[y]]
|{z}
[[y0]]
|{z}
[[y00]]
!
" " "
|{z}
[[y0]]
|{z}
[[y00]]
|{z}
[[y]]
8. Output the bottom row. The leftmost, center and right-
most cards correspond to the result values for the first,
second and third candidates.
It is relatively straightforward to confirm that the
changes done to the simplified protocol to obtain Protocol
6 will not change the output i.e. Protocol 6 will correctly
compute the voting result. The following theorem will es-
tablish the security of Protocol 6.
Theorem 6: Let n; `  1. For n voters and ` candidates,
the above voting protocol is secure. It uses n+1 shues and
(n + 2)` cards.
Proof. The opened values (in the above case, step 3, 5,
and 7) are independent of the inputs since the randomnesses
used in the shues are chosen uniformly at random and in-
dependent of the inputs. Thus, it is secure. 
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